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Abstract
We demonstrate that lower consumer search costs can lead to higher prices charged by firms. We
estimate the distribution of consumer search costs for 366 isolated retail gasoline markets, and find that
reducing the mean and standard deviation by 20% and 48%, respectively, leads to price increases in 32% of
markets and an average price increase of 5.2 cents per gallon across all markets. Thus, price transparency
regulation that results in higher prices may not stem from collusion, but from an equilibrium with less
consumer search.
1 Introduction
Many government regulations intend to increases consumer welfare by decreasing the cost of search. For
instance, to promote price transparency and competition, regulators have created online retail gasoline price
aggregators,1 or mandated how stations display prices for different payment methods (i.e., cash and credit
card). While these regulations decrease consumer search costs, they also make the cost of search more
homogeneous across consumers.
This paper analyzes how policy affecting the distribution of consumer search costs impact pricing and
search behavior. We find decreasing both the mean and standard deviation of search costs can have the
unintended consequence of raising prices and decreasing consumer welfare. In the context of gasoline mar-
kets, requiring firms to post prices to a website will decrease the search cost for consumers at the high end
of the distribution, but leave unchanged the search cost of consumers at the low end who already perform
comparison shopping. Similarly, requiring credit card prices to be publicly displayed reduces the search cost
for consumers that prefer this payment instrument, but leaves unchanged the cost to cash buyers. Therefore,
both regulations compress the search cost distribution by decreasing the mean and variance. We demon-
strate through simulation and an empirical application that these policies can either increase or decrease
the expected price paid by consumers, depending upon the relative decrease of the mean and variance, and
demographic variables that determine the search cost distribution within a market. Previous research uses
tacit collusion to explain price increases following the introduction of price aggregation technology (Boren-
stein (1998), Luco (2017)) – we show that price increases could result from competitive firms pricing to
consumers with less heterogeneous search costs.
To perform the analysis, we employ a variant of the Burdett and Judd (1983) search cost model extended
to allow for vertical product differentiation by Wildenbeest (2011). We first demonstrate how changing (i)
the mean (ii) standard deviation and (iii) both simultaneously affect the distribution of equilibrium prices
and consumer search behavior. Using a panel data set of retail gasoline prices, we estimate the distribution
of consumer search costs separately for 366 markets. With these estimates, we perform a counterfactual
experiment that reduces both the mean and variance of search costs by 20% and 48%, respectively, in each
market, and find that prices increase in 32% of markets. Prices increase by $0.052 per gallon, on average
across all markets.
∗The Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, 100 International Dr. Baltimore, MD 21202. Email: nishida@jhu.edu.
†Swarthmore College, 500 College Ave., Swarthmore, PA, 19081. Email: mremer1@swarthmore.edu.
1In 2008, South Korea required retail gas stations to report prices to a public website, Opinet. In 2011, the Austrian government
enacted similar legislation.
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2 Modeling Consumer Search
We analyze the fixed-sample search model developed by Burdett and Judd (1983) and extended by Wilden-
beest (2011) to incorporate vertical production differentiation. For ease of exposition, we present the ho-
mogeneous product version of the model. The simulations and empirical model account for vertical product
differentiation and differences in marginal cost.2
Consider N firms selling a homogeneous product to a continuum of consumers with inelastic demand
for one unit. Each consumer has a cost of search c ≥ 0, distributed i.i.d according to the CDF, Fc. Firms do
not observe a consumer’s search cost, but know Fc. Firms simultaneously choose price, which generates the
equilibrium price CDF, Fp(p); p
¯
and p¯ are its lower and upper bound, respectively. Firms have constant and
identical marginal costs, r. In equilibrium, firms either play a symmetric mixed strategy that generates price
dispersion, or all set the monopoly price, p¯.3
Consumers know Fp(p), but engage in fixed-sample search to learn individual prices. Each consumer
receives one free quote, chooses the number of additional prices to search at a per-quote cost, c, learns all
prices in the sample, and finally purchases one unit from the lowest-priced firm in the sample. Consumers
minimize total expected expenditure by choosing the number of firms to search, l − 1, where,
l = arg min
l≥1
{c · (l − 1) +
∫ p¯
p
¯
l · p(1− Fp(p))l−1f(p)dp}.
The first term, c(l − 1), is the total cost of search and the second is the expected price paid. Searching i+ 1
firms yields expected marginal savings of ∆i ≡ Ep1:i − Ep1:i+1, where p1:i is the minimum price when i
draws are taken from Fp. Accordingly, a consumer with search cost c samples i stores when ∆i−1 > c > ∆i.
The proportion of consumers with i price quotes, qi, is therefore q1 ≡ 1−Fc(∆1) and qi ≡ Fc(∆i−1)−Fc(∆i)
for i ≥ 2.
Firms maximize profits by choosing a symmetric, mixed-strategy, Fp(p), for all p ∈ [p
¯
, p¯]. Total profit is
therefore Π(p) = (p − r)[∑Ni=1 qi · iN (1 − Fp(p))i−1]. Mixed strategies imply an equilibrium condition that
each firm is indifferent between charging the monopoly price p¯ and any other price p ∈ [p
¯
, p¯],
(p¯− r)q˜1
N
= (p− r)[
N∑
i=1
q˜i · i
N
(1− Fp(p))i−1]. (1)
Firms therefore face a trade-off between setting a high price and selling to less informed customers or setting
a low price and also capturing more informed customers. Implicitly solving equation (1) for price yields the
inverse pricing function,
p(z) =
q˜1(p¯− r)∑N
i=1 iqi(1− z)i−1
+ r, (2)
where z = Fp(p).
3 Estimating the Model
The data and estimation routine are identical to those in Nishida and Remer (2017), which extends Wilden-
beest (2011) to allow for marginal cost changes over time. We provide a high-level summary of the estima-
tion, and refer interested readers to those articles for further details. We estimate the model using 30 days
(February 27th to March 28th, 2007) of daily, gas station-level data for stations located in California, Florida,
New Jersey, and Texas. We estimate search cost distributions using data from 366 “isolated” markets: a set
of stations all within 1.5 miles of each other, and all stations outside of the market are more than 1.5 miles
from every station within the market. To control for marginal cost changes, we use the NYMEX spot price of
reformulated gasoline delivered to NY Harbor, Gulf Coast, and Los Angeles for gas stations located in those
2See Nishida and Remer (2017) for a more complete treatment of the model.
3See Burdett and Judd (1983) for a proof of this claim, and Nishida and Remer (2017) for evidence of mixed-strategy pricing in the
data.
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respective regions. To control for demographic differences across markets, we use income, education, and
age data from the 2006-2010 American Community Survey.
For each observed price, we subtract a firm-specific fixed-effect to control for vertical product differentia-
tion and subtract the daily measure of wholesale cost to control for marginal cost changes. These “cleaned”
prices are then used in a nonparametric MLE routine, where the likelihood function is obtained by applying
the implicit function theorem to equation (1). Separately for each market, we estimate a collection of points,
{qi,∆i}, on the search cost CDF, F (c). The estimated points of each market’s search cost distribution are
then pooled, and nonlinear least-squares (NLS) regression is used to fit a log-normal distribution. In the NLS
regression, the mean and variance parameters of the log-normal distribution, µ and σ, respectively, depend
upon market-level characteristics. Table 1, which is reproduced from Nishida and Remer (2017) details the
regression results. The next section uses these estimates to explore changes to the search cost distribution in
an “average” market, as well as changes to each individual market.
4 Policy Experiments
Policy Experiment Within an Average Market. To build intuition, we first separately isolate the effect
of changing the (i) mean or (ii) standard deviation of the search cost distribution. We then analyze the impact
of changing both simultaneously, as would most real-world policies. Using average market demographics,
we calibrate a log-normal search cost distribution to fit the estimated parameters in Table 1. We then perturb
the search cost distribution and use equation (2) to solve for the pre and post-policy price distributions.
To analyze a decrease in the mean of the search cost distribution while holding the standard deviation
constant, we consider a “baseline” search cost CDF (Fc) that first-order stochastically dominates a “hypo-
thetical” CDF, (F ′c): F
′
c(t) > Fc(t) for any t > 0. We assume the market has five firms.
4 Column 1 in Table 2
presents the results for a 20% decrease in search costs, which are qualitatively the same for more pronounced
changes.
The results confirm conventional wisdom; a FOSD shift in the search-cost CDF leads to lower prices.
The mean price decreases from $2.727 to $2.716 per gallon, and the expected price paid, on average across
all consumers, decreases by $0.016 from $2.727. The magnitude of the effect differs across consumers with
different search costs. For example, consumers in the 25th percentile experience the largest decrease in the
price paid (−$0.038), whereas consumers in the 50th and 75th percentile experience the smallest decrease
(−$0.011) among the four categories of consumers in Table 2.
We now consider a situation in which consumers’ search costs become less heterogeneous but not com-
pletely homogeneous, while holding constant the mean of the search cost distribution. More precisely, we
consider a case in which F ′c second-order stochastically dominates the baseline search CDF (Fc); therefore,
E[c] =
∫
c dF ′c =
∫
c dFc and
∫ x
0
Fc(c)dc ≥
∫ x
0
F ′c(c)dc for all x. To perform the experiment, we decrease the
standard deviation parameter of the log-normal CDF, σ, for the hypothetical distribution, F ′c, relative to the
baseline CDF. We then update the mean parameter, µ, for the hypothetical distribution that yields the same
unconditional expected search costs, E[c].5
Column 2 in Table 2 summarizes the results when the standard deviation parameter σ is decreased by
5%, which reduces the standard deviation of search cost distribution by 19.8%.6 Prices become less dispersed
and increase. As search costs become more homogeneous, firms have less incentive to sell to consumers with
relatively low search costs, and therefore prices cluster at the high end of the price distribution. When the
standard deviation parameter is decreased by 7% there is a striking result – all firms set the monopoly price.
This is akin to Diamond (1971)’s monopoly equilibrium; however, in this case, there is still heterogeneity in
consumer search costs. This occurs because when search costs become sufficiently homogeneous sales from
low search cost consumers are insufficient to make the expected profit equal across all prices in the price
distribution, and therefore all firms set the monopoly price.
To highlight this point, we decrease the mean search cost by 20% in addition to reducing the standard
deviation. When σ decreases by 10% there is still price dispersion; however, when σ decreases by 15% no
4Additional parameter values are set to match averages in the data: income, year of education, age, and distance among stations.
5Note that we distinguish the mean parameter µ and the expected value of the log-normal distribution (“mean search cost”), which
is E[c] = eµ+
σ2
2 .
6The standard deviation of search cost is given by
√
Var[c] =
√
[(exp(σ2)− 1)] exp(2µ+ σ2).
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consumers search and all firms set the monopoly price. Thus, even small changes to the cost of search can
have large implications for prices and welfare.
Policy Experiment Within Each 366 Isolated Markets. We now reduce the mean search cost by 20%
and standard deviation parameter by 10%, which reduces the standard deviation of search cost distribution
by 48%, separately for each of the 366 isolated markets in the data. To perform the experiments, we recover
the mean and variance of the search cost distribution for each market using the estimates in Table 1 and
pertinent demographic variables. Then we solve for the equilibrium price distribution and consumers search
behavior using the structural model. Because multiple price dispersion equilibria may exist, we try 10 unique
starting values for each market.
Figure 1 depicts the mean price change in each market. The distribution is bimodal with the modes
falling on opposite sides of zero. In the left mode, price dispersion exists and average prices decrease, due
to lower mean search costs and increased search intensity. In the right mode, average prices increase. Prices
increase in 32 % of markets, and the average price change across markets is positive and $0.052 per gallon.
Of the markets that experience a price increase, 51% move to the monopoly equilibrium and 49% still have
price dispersion. In the latter markets, the effect of decreasing σ outweighs the impact of reducing µ. To
confirm the finding, we reduce the standard deviation parameter by 15%, while maintaining a 20% reduction
in mean search cost. We find more markets with price increases (41%) and an average price change across
markets of $0.088 per gallon.
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6Figure 1
Change in Average Price by Market: 20% Decrease in Expected Value and 10% Decrease in Standard Deviation of Search 
Costs
Distributional assumption Lognormal
Mean of distribution
  Constant -6.926***
(1.980)
   Mean income 0.716***
  (0.175)
  Mean years of education -0.361
(0.962)
  Mean age -0.572
(0.510)
  Mean distance among stations -0.594***
(0.214)
Standard deviation of distribution
   Constant -0.014
(2.590)
  Standard deviation of income 0.502***
(0.123)
  Standard deviation of years of education -0.284
(0.326)
  Standard deviation of age -1.392**
(0.571)
Mean squared error 17.33
Number of observations 726
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Table 1
Nonlinear Least Square Estimation of Search-Cost Cumulative Distribution
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The 
regressors are in logs.  
Baseline (1) (2)
20% Mean Decrease 5% Decrease in SD parameter
Expected price  (Ep) 2.727 2.716 2.746
Expected price paid 2.718 2.702 2.743
  people with 10%ile search costs 2.682 2.657 2.732
  people with 25%ile search costs 2.727 2.689 2.746
  people with 50%ile search costs 2.727 2.716 2.746
  people with 75%ile search costs 2.727 2.716 2.746
Expected search cost 1.005 0.804 1.005
Expected paid search cost 0.004 0.003 0.002
  people with 10%ile search costs 0.022 0.023 0.010
  people with 25%ile search costs 0.000 0.021 0.000
  people with 50%ile search costs 0.000 0.000 0.000
  people with 75%ile search costs 0.000 0.000 0.000
Proportion of people with i price quotes (qi)
q1 0.767 0.708 0.864
q2 0.071 0.085 0.490
q3 0.045 0.055 0.028
q4 0.030 0.037 0.017
q5 0.087 0.114 0.042
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Table 2
The Effect of a Change in Search Costs on Equilibrium Price Distribution
Notes: The number of simulated price observations is 100. SD parameter referes to the standard deviation 
parameter of the log-normal distribution.
